EXAMPLE: Any primary substance (favorites include an individual man and a horse).

The highest type of being goes to beings with svabhāva that can stand upon their own; that is, to beings that are not SAID-OF and not PRESENT-IN. From his examples we can surmise that he means concrete particulars that are members of natural kinds.

[Just what are these congealings and precipitations that nature spontaneously buds out of its indeterminate but lawful background? That nature produces things with attributes and modes is unsurprising. But that nature should produce such robust little things in the first place is astonishing.]

Problem: By the above definition, primary substances are not the sorts of beings which can be accidents. What can this mean? To call a particular “non-accidental” can mean both (1) that is it not predicated of anything accidentally, and (2) that is it not manifestly temporary, accidentally characterized, or artificially unified. (Example: Socrates-seated-in-a-chair.)

The result: primary substances must be essential unities, not a jumble of bits that is a mere basis for unifying imputation. Would “this car” count as an essential unity? The collection is purposive and not arbitrary. But its origin, the fiat of the inventor, is accidental. It seems that only self-organizing collections can count as essential unities.

What can we say of primary substances generally? If the answer is “nothing”—that we can only say what they are not—then we are in good shape. Silence means we have found something that is truly metaphysically basic.

CONCLUSION: Primary substances as essential unities.